3:am: you argue that moral responsibility is connected with artistic self-expression, in fact you argue that being morally responsible is a species of artistic self-expression this is derived from your idea that the value of moral responsibility is connected to the value of exhibiting freedom. On this view, moral responsibility is forward-looking, aiming at future protection, reconciliation and moral formation pereboom argues that these aims can justify familiar blaming practices -- ones in the category of answerability. The same view has been critiqued somewhat more comprehensively by susan wolf (1987) under the name the deep-self view, which she attributes in its exemplary form to harry frankfurt, gary watson, and charles taylor (p 375. Deep self view of responsibility: responsibility is tied to who you are at a fundamental level wolf: sanity and the metaphysics of responsibility both frankfurt and watson hold the deep self view that i am responsible for an action not just when the action is controlled my my will be also when i have control over myself and therefore my will.
Harry frankfurt b gary watson one is responsible if one's deep self controls one's will and one is in touch with the world correctly b one is responsible if one's will controls one's actions c one is responsible if one's will controls one's actions and one's deep self controls one's will d one is responsible if one's deep self. One could view moral responsibility pragmatically, as in, you're morally responsibility for whatever your fellow moral agents will hold you accountable for in practice (just as an example) i think that if one holds that hd implies a denial of moral responsibility, one is confusing hd for fatalism. Treatments of moral responsibility that strike deep self themes have recently been offered by t m scanlon, nomy arpaly, angela smith, george sher, and sarah buss, among others 3 susan wolf provided a classic statement of the deep self view and identified precursors of the view in the works of harry frankfurt and gary watson 4 p f strawson. Given his objections, canvassed above, to the hierarchical nature of frankfurt’s view, watson offers a competing, dual-system view in which an agent is seen as being free in the sense required for moral responsibility only in cases where what the agent values and what the agent is moved to do are one and the same.
One thing strikes me: suppose you and i differ on the necessary and sufficient conditions that must obtain in order for one to be held morally responsible for one's action (i, for instance, do not believe that one need have performed the action freely in order to be held responsible, but you do. 7 in similar vein, gary watson argues that it is hard to justify the restriction of the legal defence of duress to cases in which one is coerced by another agent (rather than some other feature of the. One possibility (continuing on the analogy with intentional action) stems from the work of chandra sripada, who has argued in favor of what he calls the “deep self model” (dsm) of moral responsibility to provide a better explanation of the knobe effect for action intentionality17 what sripada argues is that intentionality attaches to. Alleged for the view, namely, that meeting the conditions of the rsv is actually insufficient for moral responsibility, that one’s action could depend on one’s real self. In against moral responsibility, bruce waller claims that although people generally meet standard requirements adduced for being morally responsible, we nevertheless aren't morally responsible no one ever deserves praise or punishment.
In her article “sanity and the metaphysics of responsibility,” susan wolf (1989) argued that [end page 293] there is a logical relationship between sanity and responsibility wolf follows harry frankfurt, gary watson, and charles taylor in adopting the notion, with depth psychologists, that one has a “deep self. -both frankfurt and watson hold the deep self view: i am responsible for an action not just when it is within the control of my will but also when my will is a product of myself and i have some control over myself. The “deep self” is an thought presented by wolf which lays the foundation for her beliefs about duty while at the same clip trying to put the similarities in point of views posed by harry frankfurt. Courses of action in order to be free, one might be asking if moral responsibility requires that we have alternate possible courses of action 6 that is, one’s concern might be: can i really be held. On wallace’s view, a person is morally responsible for some action if and only if it would be appropriate to hold her responsible for that action 15 as moral norms of fairness, wallace contends, set the standards of appropriateness for responsibility ascriptions, this view is to be construed as the normative one that a person is morally.
Weekly discussion [weekly discussion] frankfurt's account of freedom of the will (selfphilosophy) submitted 4 years ago by oyagoya φ today i’m going to talk about harry frankfurt’s 1971 paper “freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Velop an account inspired by harry frankfurt and david shoemaker, according to which an ered morally responsible for not having done so the fault seems to lie not with necessary to have a better idea of what free action requires as gary watson (1987) un. This book provides a comprehensive, systematic theory of moral responsibilitythe authors explore the conditions under which individuals are morally responsible for actions, omissions, consequences, and emotions. So she is comfortable with harry frankfurt's attacks on his principle of alternate possibilities, which is designed to defend compatibilism against the lack of such possibilities in a deterministic world wolf's view is similar to gary watson to be accorded the status of a responsible being is to be regarded as an appropriate object of a.
One way of putting this that some theorists have found amenable is that these attitudes are not governed by the agent’s deep self 37 for purposes of responsibility, then, an action or attitude is attributable to one just in case it depends on, or expresses, one’s deep self. The “deep self” is an idea presented by wolf which lays the foundation for her beliefs about responsibility while at the same time attempting to place the similarities in viewpoints posed by harry frankfurt, gary watson, and charles taylor in regards to their beliefs on responsibility, under one inclusive umbrella. The standard view would be that being morally responsible is analytically prior, and thus it is appropriate to hold someone morally responsible only if he is indeed morally responsible (where the status of being morally responsible is independently established.
Frankfurt is known for not holding avoidability as a necessary condition for moral responsibility and has made an influential argument for this view in his 1969 article, ‘alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Views, attributable actions just are actions that express the “deep self”– ie, actions that express deep features of the agent such as his fundamental values, cares, or commitments as i show, thinking in terms of the deep self is too restrictive for an adequate account of.